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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Henry Sanchez, Jr., appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence 
against him for, Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1), pursuant to his Judgment of Conviction 
thereon. (R. 118-122). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Appellant Henry Sanchez, Jr. was charged with Possession of 
Methamphetamine, Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1) by way of Complaint filed July 1, 2010. 
(R. 13-14). 
Mr. Sanchez filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support on August 
2, 2010, along with a supporting affidavit. (R. 85-89). The District Court, the Honorable 
John K. Butler presiding, held argument on the motion on June 28, 2010. (Tr., pp. 4-26). 
Officer Kenneth Rushing testified that while on patrol, he saw what he thought 
were two juveniles "messing with a car". (Prelim. Tr., p. 5). At the hearing on motion to 
suppress, he testified that as he was driving past a parking lot, he saw two boys on 
bicycles, who ducked down behind a car. (Tr., p. 20, Lines. 18-19). He also described 
the encounter in his testimony as a "traffic stop". (Tr., p. 18, L. 24 - p. 19, L. 1 ). 
Officer Baker testified at the suppression hearing that he saw two people on 
bicycles near an automobile in a dark parking lot. As he turned around, the individuals 
fled. (Tr., p. 8, L. 24 - p. 19, L. 5). 
1 
In a memorandum opinion dated July 12, 2010, the district court denied Mr. 
Sanchez's Motion to Suppress. (R. 135-141 ). As stated above, Mr. Sanchez 
subsequently entered his plea, upon which the Court sentenced him. (R. 209-215). 
Mr. Sanchez filed a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 (R., 216-
228), which the court denied without hearing. (R., 237-239). Mr. Sanchez timely filed 
his appeal. (R. 240-244). 
11. 
ISSUES 
A Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence? 
B. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of 
seven years with 2 years fixed, 5 years indeterminate upon Mr. Sanchez following his 
plea of guilty? 
C. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Sanchez's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
A The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
A seizure occurs and continues when an officer restrains an individual so that 
considering all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 
communicate to a reasonable person that she is not at liberty to go about her business. 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650-51, 51 P.3d 461 (2002). 
? 
There is no dispute in this case that a seizure occurred when the defendant was 
apprehended and brought back to what one officer described as a "traffic stop". 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) allows an officer who has a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to conduct a brief stop of an individual. 
While "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause, there 
must be at least a minimal level of objective justification for the stop. A Terry stop must 
be based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person in question either 
has or is about to commit a crime. State v. Cox, 136 Idaho 858, 41 P.3d 744 (Ct. App. 
2002). 
The state contends that the totality of the circumstances test controls to allow the 
district court to find a reasonable, articulable suspicion under Terry. See, State v. 
VanDorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 99 p.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). Mr. Sanchez does 
not deny that a court should look to the totality of the circumstances. Mr. Sanchez's 
position is that the state in this case did not articulate facts that support a totality of 
circumstances justifying a seizure, even a limited seizure under Terry. 
In this case, Mr. Sanchez was simply in a parking lot near a vehicle. The 
testimony in the record is conclusory at best. No "reasonable, articulable, suspicion" 
was testified to. Rather, the district court relied on the officer's conclusory statement 
that he saw what he thought were two juveniles "messing with a car". (Prelim. Tr., p. 5). 
As argued previously, Inherent in an analysis of the facts and circumstances 
supporting a reasonable and articulable suspicion is the requirement that there be 
testimony and record sufficient to make a finding that such a reason was articulated. As 
stated above, other than the presence of the individuals in a parking lot near a car, no 
articulation of facts supporting a reasonable suspicion occurred. The state did not 
support the officer's conclusion with any facts. The alleged "flight" did not occur until 
after the officers approached. Therefore, the record does not support the district court's 
conclusion that there was a sufficient basis for a Terry stop. 
Unlike /1/inois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), here, there was no facts 
regarding any criminal activity on which to base a suspicion. Here, one officer testified 
he "thought" they might be messing with a car, and the other officer testified he 
"thought" they might be burglarizing a car. The officers' subjective thoughts, without any 
testimony regarding independent facts upon which to form a suspicion, do not support 
even a Terry stop type of encounter. 
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Supreme Court held that when an 
officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the 
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id., at 498. And any 
"refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 
justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 
(1991 ). 
Officer Rushing's testimony reveals that Rushing saw two unnamed and 
unidentified juveniles on a bicycles late at night next to a car. The individuals fled and 
were later apprehended by Deputy Smirko. Rushing believed this activity was 
suspicious and that a drug deal was taking place. (6/28/10 Tr., p. 17, Line 11 - p. 18, 
Line 10; p. 21 L. 16 - p. 22, Line 17; P.H Tr., p. 9, Line 17 - p. 113, Line 5). 
In State v. Zuniga, the defendant challenged the lower court's ruling that the 
initial seizure was illegal, and that thus the drugs he had in his possession should be 
4 
excluded. The court stated that a person's presence in a high crime area is of little 
probative value, being in proximity to those who are suspected of criminal activity or 
being present when a search is being executed does not give birth to probable cause. 
State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435; 146 P.2d. 697, 701 (2006). In that case the 
defendant cast away incriminating evidence during a pursuit which was personally 
witnessed by the officer. The distinguishing factor in the present matter is that Officer 
Rushing did not testify that he witnessed anything inherently illegal. 
The state essentially argues that if the individual on the bicycle was lawfully 
seized then fleeing would be illegal, and according to Zuniga once commanded to stop, 
even without reasonable suspicion, fleeing creates probable cause. In the case of State 
v. Fry, an officer instructed two subordinate officers to investigate a car which was 
parked in a parking lot late at night in order to determine "what they were up to." State v. 
Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 101 - 104; 831 P.2d. 942,943 (1992). The driver attempted to start 
the car and leave as the officers approached. The court held that the defendant was 
seized and the seizure was not based upon probable cause, nor was there a basis for a 
Terry stop. Id. 
Likewise in this case, the record contains no articulated facts or evidence upon 
which to base even a Terry stop. The testimony of the officers does not support the 
district court's conclusion. Therefore, Mr. Sanchez was free to leave the scene, and his 
leaving, even if in a hurried manner or in a flight, doe not furnish the minimal level of 
objective justification required for a detention or seizure. 
There was no testimony of any sort of independent factors constituting an 
articulable, reasonable suspicion regarding Mr. Sanchez. Therefore the evidence 
obtained from the resulting search of Mr. Sanchez's jacket should have been 
suppressed. 
Under these facts, the trial court should be reversed, the conviction overturned 
and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Seven 
Years, Two Fixed And Five Indeterminate Upon Mr. Sanchez, Following His 
Admission Plea of Guilty. 
Mr, Sanchez's arguments in support of this assertion are found in his opening 
brief, and need not be repeated. They are incorporated herein by reference. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Sanchez Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The 
Sentence Was Excessive As Initially Imposed 
Mr, Sanchez's arguments in support of this assertion are found in his opening 
brief, and need not be repeated. They are incorporated herein by reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial 
of his motion to suppress, that his conviction also be reversed, and the matter 
remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Sanchez further respectfully requests that if this 
Court does not grant the afore requested relief, that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
R 
DATED this 5th day of July, 2012. 
STEPHEN D. THOMPSON 
Appellate Public Defender 
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